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Abstract: 
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and 
has received much criticism for this decision. In this paper, we explore possible justifications. 
The case against including money in the central bank’s interest rate rule is based on a standard 
model of the monetary transmission process that underlies many contributions to research on 
monetary policy in the last two decades. Of course, if one allows for a direct effect of money 
on output or inflation as in the empirical “two-pillar” Phillips curves estimated in some recent 
contributions, it would be optimal to include a measure of (long-run) money growth in the 
rule. In this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by 
allowing for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and 
equilibrium interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary 
cross-checking and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of 
persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential output. Such misperceptions cause a bias 
in policy setting. We find that cross-checking and changing interest rates in response to 
sustained deviations of long-run money growth helps the central bank to overcome this bias. 
Our argument in favor of ECB-style cross-checking does not require direct effects of money 
on output or inflation. 
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ContrarytothemonetarypolicystrategiesoftheU.S.FederalReserveandmanyinﬂation-
targeting central banks, which assign no special role to monetary aggregates, the Euro-
pean Central Bank has maintained a separate and important role for money in its two
pillar strategy. The ECB distinguishes an ‘economic’ and a ‘monetary’ pillar:1
² “Economic analysis assesses the short to medium-term determinants of price de-
velopments. The focus is on real activity and ﬁnancial conditions in the econ-
omy. The economic analysis takes account of the fact that price developments
over those horizons are inﬂuenced largely by the interplay of supply and demand
in the goods, services and factor markets.”
² “Monetary analysis focuses on a longer-term horizon than the economic analy-
sis. It exploits the long-run link between money and prices. The monetary analysis
mainly serves as a means of cross-checking, from a medium to long-term per-
spective, the short to medium-term indications for monetary policy coming from
the economic analysis.”
In terms of economic theory, the long-run link noted by the ECB is related to the equa-
tion of exchange, that is, the deﬁnition of the velocity of money. Rewritten in growth
terms it relates money growth, inﬂation and output growth to the change in velocity. In
the long-run, once output growth and the change in velocity have settled down to trend,
the equation of exchange implies a proportional relationship between money growth and
inﬂation. In terms of empirics, this relationship has manifested itself most clearly in pe-
riods of very high inﬂation. Recent empirical assessments, however, have re-emphasized
its validity in periods of moderate to low inﬂation in leading industrial economies.2
On this basis, Gerlach (2003, 2004) has proposed to augment the standard Phillips
curve, which accounts for shorter-term inﬂation dynamics, resource utilization gaps and
inﬂationary shocks, with a measure of long-run or low-frequency money growth.3 His
estimates indicate a direct effect of ﬁltered money growth on inﬂation. Such an aug-
mented Phillips curve uniﬁes the two pillars of the ECB in a single assessment of in-
ﬂationary risks, and—if treated as a structural relationship—provides a rationale for
including ﬁltered money growth in the central bank’s optimal interest rate rule. Con-
sequently, optimal interest rate policy would embody a small but systematic response
to ongoing monetary developments. The ECB’s description of its strategy, however,
does not rely on a direct effect of money on inﬂation in the Phillips curve. Rather, it
1See http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/monetarypolicy2004en.pdf.
2See, for example, Gerlach (2003, 2004), ECB (2004), Haug and Dewald (2004, Pill and Rautanen
(2006), Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006a, 2006b). Bordo and Filardo (2006) consider different
inﬂation zones including low inﬂation and deﬂation.
3A similar proposal has been made by Neumann and Greiber (2004).
1focuses on the long-run link and its usefulness for identifying medium- to long-term in-
ﬂationary risks. Thus, we aim to develop an alternative rationale for including money in
the policy rule that stays as close as possible to the ECB’s stated reasons. The ECB’s
former chief economist, Otmar Issing, wrote on the monetary pillar: “In line with the
argument of a closer relationship between money and inﬂation at lower frequencies, the
function ascribed to the monetary pillar is to reveal medium-term risks to price stability
..” but “... there is no mechanical monetary policy reaction to deviations of M3 growth
from the reference value” and “... cross-checking the information from the economic
analysis with the information from the monetary pillar is ... a crucial element underpin-
ning the robustness and medium-term policy orientation”. He concludes: “you can also
think of the monetary pillar as the institutionalized promise of what the ECB will con-
tinue to do in the future; cultivating, as far as possible, an approach to central banking
geared towards constant learning and encompassing all available information relevant
for monetary policy”.4
We formally characterize ECB-style cross-checking using a policy rule with two
components. The ﬁrst component aims to control inﬂationary risks based on a standard
Phillips curve and aggregate demand relationship. Essentially, it is the optimal interest
rate rule of an inﬂation-targeting central bank. If implemented successfully this rule
should ensure that inﬂation averages around the central bank’s inﬂation target. Its weak-
ness is that it relies on knowledge of unobservables such as the equilibrium real interest
rate and potential output that may be subject to large and persistent policy mispercep-
tions.5
The second component captures the idea of cross-checking using the long-run rela-
tionship between money and inﬂation. We assume that the central bank checks regularly
whether a ﬁltered money growth series adjusted for output and velocity trends averages
around the inﬂation target. If the central bank obtains successive signals of a sustained
deviation of inﬂation from target it adjusts interest rates accordingly.
Our simulations indicate that persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential
output induce a policy bias that translates into persistent deviations of inﬂation and
money growth from target. In this case, our “two-pillar” policy rule may effectively
overturn the policy bias. Cross-checking relies on ﬁltered series of actual money and
output growth without requiring estimates of potential output. Nevertheless, it leads to
adjustments in interest rate policy that offset the bias resulting from policy mispercep-
tions. Indirectly, however, it helps the central bank to learn the proper level of interest
rates.
4See Issing (2005).
5See, e.g, Orphanides (2003) and Orphanides et al. (2000a).
22 Money growth and inﬂation in the long run
The equation of exchange deﬁnes velocity, vt =¡mt +pt +yt, where (m;y;p) denote the
logarithms of money, output and the aggregate price level. Taking ﬁrst differences we
approximate the equation in growth terms:
Dvt = ¡Dmt +Dpt +Dyt: (1)
D is the ﬁrst-difference operator. In the long-run, output growth and the change in veloc-
itywillsettledowntotrendandrevealaproportionalrelationshipbetweenmoneygrowth
and inﬂation. In the short-run, however, ﬂuctuations in velocity and output growth are
likely to obscure this relationship. The behavior of velocity may be characterized as a
function of the nominal interest rate, i, real output and money demand shocks, emd, using
a standard money demand equation:
mt ¡ pt = gyyt ¡giit +emd
t : (2)
Here, gy denotes the income elasticity and gi the semi-interest rate elasticity of money
demand. Money demand shocks are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance s2
md. Taking ﬁrst differences, re-arranging (2) and combining with (1) we
obtain:
Dv = (1¡gy)Dy+giDi+Demd: (3)
Long-run equilibrium values (superscript *) can then be determined as follows. In the
long-run, money demand shocks would average to zero, and the nominal interest rate
would settle down to its steady state level. Thus, the long-run trend in velocity corre-
sponds to Dv¤
t = (1¡gy)Dy¤
t , and long-run inﬂation is proportional to long-run money
growth adjusted for output and velocity trends:6
Dp¤
t = Dm¤
t ¡gyDy¤
t : (4)
Recent studies obtained empirical support for this long-run relationship using var-
ious ﬁlters or frequency-speciﬁc estimation. And more interestingly, they have found
money growth to lead inﬂation at this frequency. To give an example, Gerlach (2004)
uses the following ﬁlter
µ
f
t = µ
f
t¡1+l
³
µt ¡µ
f
t¡1
´
(5)
to approximate long-run values of inﬂation and money growth. In his work, µt may
alternatively stand for money growth, Dmt, or money growth adjusted for output growth.
6A trend in velocity may not only arise from potential output growth Dy¤
t with an income elasticity gy
different from unity, but also from other sources such as ﬁnancial innovations (see Orphanides and Porter
(2001) and Masuch, Pill and Willeke (2001)).
3In our paper we will follow equation (4) and adjust money growth using the estimate of
the income-elasticity of money demand, i.e.
µ
f
t = Dm
f
t ¡gyDy
f
t : (6)
3 Monetary policy design without money
Most research on monetary policy rules in the last two decades has focused on models,
in which the monetary transmission mechanism works as follows: the nominal interest
rate affects the real interest rate due to price rigidity, the real rate inﬂuences the output
gap via aggregate demand and the output gap impacts on inﬂation via a standard Phillips
curve. Thus, monetary aggregates play no direct role in the transmission of policy from
nominal interest rates to inﬂation.7 Money supply instead is determined recursively from
a money demand equation.
To illustrate this point we use a simple New-Keynesian style model with backward-
looking expectations in the spirit of Svenssson (1997), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
and Orphanides and Wieland (2000). The model consists of a Phillips curve and an
aggregate demand equation:
pt = pe
t+1+ay(yt ¡y¤
t )+ep;t; (7)
yt ¡y¤
t =
¡
ye
t+1¡y
¤;e
t+1
¢
¡br(it ¡pe
t+1¡r¤
t )+ey;t; (8)
where pe
t+1 = pt¡1; ye
t+1¡y
¤;e
t+1 = yt¡1¡y¤
t¡1:
pt = Dpt denotes inﬂation, (ep;t;ey;t) stand for zero-mean cost-push and demand shocks
respectively with variances (s2
p;s2
y), r¤ denotes the long-run equilibrium interest rate
and the superscript e refers to market expectations, which we assume to be backward-
looking.
An inﬂation-targeting central bank would set the nominal interest rate it in order to
minimize expected discounted inﬂation deviations from target
min
it;it+1;:::
Et
½ ¥
å
s=t
ds¡t (ps¡p?)
2
¾
; (9)
where p¤ denotes the central bank’s inﬂation target and d its discount factor. Conse-
quently, optimal monetary policy corresponds to a Taylor-style interest rate rule, which
responds to lagged inﬂation and output gaps but not to money growth:
i
opt
t = r¤
t +pt¡1+
1
aybr
(pt¡1¡p¤)+
1
br
(yt¡1¡y¤
t¡1): (10)
7Exceptions are studies of the so-called ‘P-star’ model, originally of Hallman, Porter and Small (1991),
such as Gerlach and Svensson (2003) and Gerdesmeier, Motto and Pill (2002).
4The superscript ‘opt’ refers to ‘optimal’.
To be clear, the central bank achieves the desired interest rate setting by conducting
open-market operations that inﬂuence the money supply. Thus, the money supply is
determined according to the money demand equation (2) consistently with the desired
policy rate, current output and the price level. However, money does not appear as a
variable in the central bank’s optimal interest rate rule and the remainder of the economy
is automatically insulated from money demand shocks. Of course, the model deﬁned by
equations (7), (8), (10) and (2) also exhibits the long-run relationship between money
growth and inﬂation discussed in the preceding section and emphasized by the ECB’s
monetary pillar.
4 The two-pillar Phillips curve and policy design
Inspired by the evidence for the long-run relationship between money and inﬂation, Ger-
lach (2003, 2004) proposed to include a ﬁltered measure of money growth or adjusted
money growth in the estimation of the short-run Phillips curve. A simpliﬁed version of
the two-pillar Phillips curve is given by
pt = aµµ
f
t +appt¡1+ay(yt ¡y¤
t )+ep;t; (11)
where we deﬁne adjusted ﬁltered money growth µ
f
t as in equations (5) and (6) and as-
sume that the weights on ﬁltered money growth and lagged inﬂation sum to one, i.e.
ap = 1¡aµ.
In this subsection, we intend to make just one simple point. Namely, if any central
bank were to consider this empirical two-pillarPhillips curve as a structural relationship8
it would conclude that a measure of ﬁltered money growth should enter in its interest
rate rule. Replacing the standard accelerationist Phillips curve in (7) with the two-pillar
Phillips curve (11) we proceed to derive the optimal interest rate rule for the model
comprising equations (11), (8), (9) and (2):
i
2p
t =
aybr
aybr +aµlgi
r¤
t +
aybr
aybr +aµlgi
pt¡1+
1¡aµl
aybr +aµlgi
µ
1¡aµ
1¡aµl
pt¡1¡p?
¶
(12)
+
ay
aybr +aµlgi
¡
yt¡1¡y?
t¡1
¢
+
aµ
aybr +aµlgi
h
(1¡l)µ
f
t¡1+lgiit¡1¡lemd;t¡1
i
:
The superscript 2p refers to the two-pillar Phillips curve underlying this rule. It is more
complicated than the rule given by (10) because the nominal interest rate inﬂuences
8GerlachtypicallyrefrainsfromastructuralinterpretationwiththeexceptionofGerlach(2004)wherehe
introduces long-run money growth as a proxy for market expectations of inﬂation. Theoretical foundations
for direct effects of money on aggregate demand and inﬂation can be obtained from micro-founded models
that allow for non-separability of money and consumption in household utility. Empirical implementations,
however, have failed to detect strong direct effects (cf. Ireland (2004) and Andres et al. (2006)).
5inﬂation not only via aggregate demand but also via a small contribution of current
money supply to ﬁltered money growth, µ
f
t . Substituting out this effect leaves us with
the lagged interest rate and the lagged money demand shock in the rule. However, the
most important new element is the lagged ﬁltered (and adjusted) money growth rateµ
f
t¡1.
Of course, if the coefﬁcient on ﬁltered money growth in the two-pillar Phillips curve, aµ,
is set to zero, the interest rule again collapses to the speciﬁcation without money in (10).
5 ECB-style cross-checking and policy design
The interest rate rule derived in the preceeding section can be viewed as a possible in-
terpretation of the ECB’s two pillar strategy. Our understanding, however, is that the
ECB’s strategy as stated does not require a direct effect of money on inﬂation in the
Phillips curve. The ECB’s description of cross-checking suggests to us that it uses the
monetary pillar to accumulate evidence signalling trend changes in inﬂation. The mon-
etary pillar appears to stand for the ECB’s concern for ‘robustifying’ its policy under
uncertainty and is subjected to regular scrutiny and learning.
Thus, we develop an alternative characterization of ECB-style cross-checking that
stays as close as possible to the ECB’s own description. Our proposed interest rate rule
has two components:
iCC
t = iEA
t +iMA
t (13)
Here the superscript CC refers to cross-checking, EA to the interest rate setting implied
by the ECB’s ‘economic analysis’ and MA to an additive adjustment in interest rate
setting that arises from the ECB’s ‘monetary analysis’. We set the ﬁrst component equal
to the optimal interest rate rule in the baseline model:
iEA
t = i
opt
t as deﬁned in equation (10). (14)
This interest rate setting should ensure that inﬂationary risks based on a standard Phillips
curve are controlled perfectly and inﬂation ﬂuctuates randomly around the mean, p¤.
However, this component relies on knowledge of unobservables such as the equilibrium
real interest rate, r¤, or potential output, y¤, that may be subject to large and persistent
policy misperceptions.
The second component, iMA
t , is novel and captures the idea of cross-checking us-
ing the long-run relationship between money and inﬂation. This component is additive
and persistent, because it is intended to offset persistent policy biases due to imperfect
information. We assume that the central bank regularly tests whether ﬁltered and ad-
justed money growth, µf, still averages around the inﬂation target. Thus, the central
6bank computes the normally-distributed test statistic,
k =
µ
f
t¡1¡p¤
sµf
; (15)
and checks whether k deviates from a critical value kcrit. sµf denotes the standard de-
viation when iEA
t = iopt is implemented with correct values of potential output and the
mean of µf corresponds to p¤. If the central bank obtains successive signals of a sus-
tained deviation from target, i.e. (k > kcrit for N periods) or (k < ¡kcrit for N periods),
it responds by adjusting interest rates accordingly.9
iMA
t =
8
> <
> :
iMA
t¡1+( 1
aybr)(µ
f
t¡1¡p¤) if k > kcrit or k < ¡kcrit for N periods
iMA
t¡1+0 else
(16)
As long as iEA
t = i
opt
t is implemented with full knowledge of potential output, y¤
t and the
real equilibrium rate, r¤, cross-checking with regard to iMA
t will almost never lead to an
adjustment in interest rates. Under imperfect knowledge, however, cross-checking may
once in a while have a very important effect on interest rate policy.10
6 Cross-checking and policy misperceptions
Recent research exploiting data on historical revisions to real-time estimates of the out-
put gap has identiﬁed very persistent policy misperceptions.11 The persistence of mea-
surement errors arises primarily from biased estimates of unobservable potential output,
since revisions to actual output decline more rapidly than those to the output gap. Thus,
if a central bank relies on potential output measures in policy design, its policy stance
maybebiasedforasustainedperiodoftime. Toillustratethiseffectwedeﬁnethepolicy-
maker’s estimate of potential output, ˆ y¤
t = y¤
t +biast, as the sum of true potential output
and a measure of the misperception denoted by biast, and include it in the baseline rule:
iEA
t = i
opt
t = r¤
t +pt¡1+
1
aybr
(pt¡1¡p¤)+
1
br
(yt¡1¡y¤
t¡1¡biast¡1): (17)
9The response coefﬁcient on inﬂation deviations from target is the same as in iEA
t , namely 1
aybr :
10ThetwoparametersofiMA
t , kcrit andN playdifferentroles. kcrit reﬂectstheprobabilitythatanobserved
deviation of µf from p? is purely accidental (for example a 5% or 1% signiﬁcance level). N deﬁnes the
number of successive deviations in excess of this critical value. Thus, the greater N the longer the central
bank waits to accumulate evidence of a sustained policy bias. For example, if kcrit is set to the 1% critical
value for the normal distribution (2.575) and the critical number of periods of sustained deviations N is set
to 4, the probability of such an event in the absence of policy misperceptions would be less than 10¡8.
11See Orphanides (2003) and Orphanides et al. (2000) who estimate a worst-case process of mispercep-
tions with a near unit root (0:96) and standard deviation of 3.77% using quarterly revisions from 1966 to
1994.
7The resulting bias in interest rate policy will induce a persistent deviation of inﬂation
from target. For example, if the central bank’s estimate of potential output were to
remain permanently 1% above its true level (i.e. biast = 18t), average inﬂation would
increase by (aybr)(br)¡1 percentage points.
To illustrate this point further we calibrate the model with the standard Phillips curve
and backward-looking expectations deﬁned by equations (7), (8) and (2). The calibration
of the parameters is summarized in Table 1. We then simulate the interest rate rule (17)
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Economic interpretation
¡br -1 Real interest rate elasticity of aggregate demand (in line
with Andres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
ay 0.5 Elasticity of Phillips curve w.r.t. output gap (broadly in
line with Gerlach (2004)).
gy 0.1 Income elasticity of money demand (in line with Andes
et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
¡gi -0.4 Interest rate elasticity of money demand (in line with An-
dres et al. (2006) and Ireland (2004)).
l 0.2 Weighting parameter of ﬁlter (broadly in line in Gerlach
(2004))
r¤;Dy¤
t ;p? 2 Equilibrium real interest rate, potential output growth and
inﬂation target
sp;sy;smd 0.8 Standard deviation of cost-push, demand and money de-
mand shocks
sµf 0.38 Standard deviation of µf
kcrit 1% Critical value for the cross-checking rule.
N 4 Number of periods required for a sustained deviation in
the cross-checking rule.
with the following sequence of policy misperceptions:
for t = (1;10) bias(t) = 0
for t = (11;12;13;14) bias(t) = (1;2;3;4)
for t = (15;100) bias(t) = 4
for t = (101;102;103) bias(t) = (3;2;1)
for t = (104;200) bias(t) = 1
(18)
The central bank’s initial estimate of potential output is assumed to coincide with the
true value. In periods 11 to 14 the central bank begins to overestimate potential output
leading to a bias of 4% from period 14 onwards. In the calibrated model this misper-
ception will cause a bias of -4% in the central bank’s interest rate response to short-run
inﬂationary risks. Ultimately, this policy bias will induce an increase in average inﬂation
of 2 percentage points. Accordingly, money growth and the long-run level of nominal
interest rates will also rise by 2 percentage points. ¿From period 100 onwards the cen-
tral bank’s overestimate of potential output declines to 1% and the resulting deviation in
8average inﬂation to 0.5 percentage points.
Figure 1: Output Gap Misperceptions and the Money-Inﬂation Link
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Figure 1 presents a simulation of the consequences of policy misperceptions for
a single draw of normally-distributed cost-push, demand and money demand shocks.
Given the many alternative sources of short-run ﬂuctuations in inﬂation the persistent
increase due to policy misperceptions cannot be immediately read from inﬂation real-
izations. Nevertheless, the ﬁltered measures of inﬂation, pf, and money growth, Dmf,
eventually reveal the increase in average money growth and inﬂation. This simulation
shows how policy misperceptions regarding potential output would render the long-run
relationship between money growth and inﬂation quite apparent in the data. In the short
run, however, money growth may deviate substantially from inﬂation due to movements
in interest rates and output as well as money demand shocks.
This simulation emphasizes the weakness of the policy rule, iEA
t = iopt, in the event
of persistent misses on potential output. A similar effect would arise from incorrect
estimates of the equilibrium real interest rate r¤. Of course, one may argue that the
process of misperceptions in (17) is an extreme example and that the central bank will
learn from its mistakes. Thus, we proceed to show that cross-checking as deﬁned by
the rule in equation (16) provides a convenient and effective avenue for learning and
correcting the central bank’s policy bias.
We repeat the preceding simulation using the cross-checking rule, iCC
t , deﬁned by
(16) which includes an additive and persistent adjustment in the event of sustained de-
viations of ﬁltered (adjusted) money growth from target. The outcome is reported in
Figure 2. We have dropped the panel with actual money growth, Dm, and have instead
9included a panel reporting the bias in the central bank’s estimate of potential output,
biast, and the adjustment in interest rates due to monetarist cross-checking. This adjust-
ment corresponds to iMA
t as deﬁned in equations (15) and (16). The cross-checking rule
Figure 2: Output Gap Misperceptions and ECB-Style Cross-Checking
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responds to the increase in ﬁltered money growth, µ
f
t¡1, fairly quickly after the policy
bias has arisen. The interest rate adjustment of ( 1
aybr)(µ
f
t¡1¡p¤) almost perfectly offsets
the policy bias arising from potential output, ( 1
br)(biast¡1). Once the misperception of
potential output declines after period 100, cross-checking soon leads to another adjust-
ment of interest rates. In the preceding simulation the parameters of the cross-checking
rule were set as follows: kcrit was set to the 1% critical value (2.575) and the number of
periods required for a sustained deviation, N, was equal to 4 periods. The parameter l,
which determines how ﬂexibly ﬁltered money growth, µ
f
t , responds to innovations was
set to 0:2.
To assess the sensitivity of our ﬁndings we draw 1000 series of shocks of length
200 from a normal distribution and use them to conduct a set of alternative simulations.
Some of the ﬁndings are reported in Figure 3. The bottom left panel of Figure 3 reports
the average path of the interest rate adjustment due to monetary cross-checking, i.e.
iMA
t , over 1000 simulations under the same parameter settings as in the single simulation
displayed in Figure 2. This panel conﬁrms that, on average, cross-checking leads to
the appropriate interest rate adjustments offsetting the policy bias due to output gap
misperceptions. The other panels in Figure 3 consider alternative values of l and kcrit.
Reducing l to 0.1 implies smoother ﬁltering of money growth. Consequently, it takes
longer to detect a persistent change and the interest adjustment from cross-checking
10Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis Regarding the Performance of Cross-Checking
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happens somewhat later in the top left panel than in the bottom left panel of Figure 3.
Lowering kcrit to the 5-percent level (i.e. 1.96) renders cross-checking more sensitive
to trend changes in money growth. Consequently, the interest-rate adjustments happen
somewhat earlier in the second column of panels than in the ﬁrst column.
7 Outlook
We have reviewed two possible rationales for including a smoothed measure of money
growthinthecentralbank’sinterestraterule. First, wehaveconﬁrmedthatthetwo-pillar
Phillips curve presented in the recent literature–if considered a structural relationship–
would provide such a rationale. More interestingly, however, we have also shown that
money can still play a very useful role in the central bank’s interest rate rule if the
economy corresponds to a more standard model, which does not incorporate a direct
effect of money on inﬂation.
We have presented a novel, formal characterization of ECB-style cross-checking. To
our knowledge this is the ﬁrst formal characterization of the ECB’s two pillar strategy
with cross-checking as an interest rate rule. Under the unrealistic assumption that the
true values of potential output and equilibrium real interest rates are known to the cen-
tral bank our speciﬁcation of cross-checking would never come into play. However, with
imperfect knowledge there is a possibility of policy misperceptions. These mispercep-
tions may generate sustained deviations of inﬂation from target. Due to the long-run link
11between money growth and inﬂation these deviations are also apparent in ﬁltered mea-
sures of money growth. Thus, a central bank that responds to persistent and signiﬁcant
deviations of money growth by adjusting interest rates can effectively offset the policy
bias arising from misperceptions about potential output and other unobservables.
Our ﬁndings open up several interesting avenues for further research. For exam-
ple, allowing for unforeseen, permanent shifts in velocity, i.e. shifts in money demand
parameters, the information content of long-run money growth would depend on how
quickly the central bank learns the new parameter values.12 Furthermore, we have
focused on strict inﬂation targeting with backward-looking expectations. In this case,
cross-checking for persistent shifts is relatively straightforward as inﬂation and adjusted
money-growth are expected to be white-noise processes. Extending the analysis to allow
for partially forward-looking market expectations would not change this feature of our
economy. However, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (with the output gap in the central bank’s
loss function) would introduce mean reversion in inﬂation and adjusted money growth
dynamics. In this case, a more sophisticated test may be required for cross-checking.
Finally, our baseline model may be extended to render ﬁltered money growth a leading
indicator of ﬁltered inﬂation, such that it clearly dominates ﬁltered inﬂation as the object
of cross-checking.
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